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I. Referentiality and incompleteness 
 
Genuine singular terms, such as proper names or (presumably) demonstrative pronouns, 
are referential; by which I mean that their conventional use is to refer. For every such 
term  there is a linguistic convention in virtue of which, whenever  is used, there must 
be a unique object x such that the speaker uses  to refer to x. The modal 'must' here 
indicates that the condition is a felicity condition: a condition which must be satisfied 
for the use of the expression to be felicitous. Note that, in stating the convention, I have 
taken the notion of 'reference' as primitive. The notion of reference at stake here is the 
pragmatic notion: speaker's reference, as it is sometimes called. To refer in that sense 
(the pragmatic sense) is, very roughly, to draw the hearer's attention upon some object 
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for the purpose of predicating something of that object, and to do so in the overt manner 
characteristic of human communication. 
 The linguistic convention governing the use of a referential term does not 
merely specify that there must be a unique object referred to by the speaker (pragmatic 
condition); it also specifies that the object in question must possess whatever properties 
the referential expression encodes as part of its linguistic meaning (descriptive 
condition). For example the referent of 'I' must be the speaker; the referent of 'she' must 
be a female person; etc. In the case of proper names, I have argued that the relevant 
descriptive condition is metalinguistic: it involves the property of being called by that 
name (in the contextually relevant community).
i
 But the proper treatment of names is a 
controverted matter which I will keep away from in this paper. 
 Various distinctions can be made with respect to the descriptive condition 
encoded by a referential term. In the case of 'I' the descriptive condition happens to be 
uniquely identifying (insofar as an utterance typically has a unique utterer); but the 
descriptive condition associated with the third person pronoun 'she' is satisfied by every 
female person, hence it is far from uniquely identifying. Another interesting difference 
between the descriptive conditions respectively associated with 'I' and 'she' is this. In 
the case of 'I' the descriptive condition is token-reflexive. The referent is the utterer of 
this token. In the case of 'she' the condition is not token-reflexive: it is the general 
condition that the referent be a female person.
ii
 Note that, contrary to what the 'I'/'she' 
contrast suggests, the descriptive condition may be token-reflexive without being 
uniquely identifying. In the plural, the first person pronoun ('we') arguably refers to a 
group which must contain the speaker among its members. That descriptive condition is 
token-reflexive — the speaker is the person who utters the relevant token of 'we' — but 
it is no more uniquely-identifying than the descriptive condition associated with 'she'. 
There is an indefinite number of groups containing the speaker among their members. 
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 Whether or not the associated descriptive condition is uniquely identifying, a 
referential expression denotes, or semantically refers to, a single object in a given 
context. The denotation or semantic referent is that object which, in the context at hand, 
satisfies the complex pragmatic-cum-descriptive condition. For example the referent of 
a use of 'she' is that female person whom the speaker refers to in uttering that word. If 
no object, or more than one object, satifies the complex pragmatic-cum-descriptive 
condition, the expression fails to denote anything and carries no semantic value, in that 
context. 
 From what I have said it follows that the semantic referent is parasitic on the 
speaker's referent, in the sense that the expression does not refer unless the speaker 
herself refers to some object. Still we make room for a distinction between speaker's 
reference and semantic reference. The semantic referent must satisfy the descriptive 
condition associated with the expression by the rules of the language. If the speaker's 
referent does not satisfy the descriptive condition, it will not acquire the status of 
semantic referent. That is not to say that something else will be the semantic referent, in 
such circumstances. That is ruled out in virtue of the pragmatic condition. In a context 
in which the speaker mistakenly says 'she' while pointing to a man, the speaker's 
referent (the man pointed to) does not acquire the status of semantic referent, but even 
if there is a unique female around, she does not become the semantic referent either. 
Something cannot become the semantic referent unless it satisfies the pragmatic 
condition, that is, unless it is also the speaker's referent.  
 Two further properties of referential terms must be mentioned, one semantic and 
the other epistemic. First, referential terms are 'directly referential'. The semantic 
referent is the referential term's semantic value — what it contributes to the truth-
conditions of the utterance in which it occurs. The complex pragmatic-cum-descriptive 
condition associated with the referential term is not itself among the truth-conditions of 
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the utterance, but among its felicity conditions: it constrains the context in which the 
expression can felicitously occur. A referential expression is felicitously used only if 
there is one and only one object x such that (i) x is F (descriptive condition) and (ii) x is 
referred to by the speaker (pragmatic condition). Only in a context meeting those 
conditions will the referential expression contribute something to the content of the 
utterance in which it occurs. What it contributes, as we have seen, is its semantic 
referent: the object which contextually satisfies the complex pragmatic-cum-descriptive 
condition. Hence the content of an utterance G() in which  is a referential term is a 
singular proposition; a proposition true iff the semantic referent of  satisfies G( ), and 
false otherwise.  
 Second property: Since the content of a referential utterance G() is singular, to 
understand the utterance — to grasp its content — one must entertain a de re thought 
involving the referent of . A thought to the effect that whatever contextually satisfies 
the complex condition is G will not do: for the content of such a thought is irreducibly 
general. Proper understanding requires being en rapport with the object, being 
acquainted with it so as to be able to entertain de re thoughts about it. This means that 
the interpreter must possess a dossier of information concerning the object, a dossier 
which the use of the referential term will evoke and activate, thus making 're-
identification' possible. Re-identification occurs, Strawson tells us, ‘if and only if the 
singular term used establishes for the hearer an identity, and the right identity, between 
the thought of what-is-being-spoken-of-by-the-speaker and the thought of some object 
already within the reach of the hearer's own knowledge, experience, or perception, 
some object, that is, which the hearer could, in one way or another, pick out or identify 
for himself, from his own resources’ (Strawson 1961: 63). 
 Let us now turn to definite descriptions. They can be treated as referential terms, 
as Strawson proposed (Strawson 1950, 1952). On that treatment, the linguistic material 
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following the definite article (e.g. the phrase 'man with a brown hat' in the definite 
description 'the man with a brown hat') encodes the descriptive condition which the 
referent has to satisfy; but there is no implication that one and only one object satisfies 
that condition. Uniqueness implication there is, but it pertains to the pragmatic 
condition: what is implied by the use of the definite article is that there is a unique 
object such that the speaker is referring to that object. The descriptive condition 
encoded by the nominal expression following the definite article is meant to help the 
hearer identify the relevant object. The object in question — the speaker's referent — 
becomes the description's semantic referent (or denotatum, as I will henceforth call it) 
just in case it actually satisfies the descriptive condition. 
 There are two basic arguments in support of a Strawsonian, referentialist 
account of definite descriptions: the similarity-with-pronouns argument, and the 
incompleteness argument. 
The similarity-with-pronouns argument goes like this. Third-person pronouns, 
when deictically used, are commonly treated as referential terms. The speaker, looking 
at a woman, says 'She is vulgar', thereby referring to the woman. The direction of the 
speaker's gaze and the descriptive condition associated with the pronoun 'she' enable the 
hearer to figure out that the speaker is referring to that woman whom he also can 
perceive. All that is straigthforward. Now exactly the same story can be told if the 
speaker, instead of using the third person pronoun, uses a definite description and says: 
'The woman is vulgar'. As Stephen Schiffer puts it, ‘the two cases have exact 
psychological parity’ (Schiffer 1997: 263). 
 An opponent of the referential account can argue that 'the woman' is a special 
case, namely, an incomplete definite description — a type of description which, 
precisely because it is incomplete, requires completion by means of an act of 
demonstrative reference. In such cases, the descriptive condition is not uniquely 
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identifying and we need to rely on the context to fix the denotatum. In normal cases, 
however, the descriptive condition is identifying by itself and we don't have to rely on 
pragmatic factors. There, for the anti-referentialist, lies the difference between 
descriptions and pronouns: it is in the nature of the (demonstrative) pronoun 'she' that 
we need an act of reference on the speaker part to fix the denotatum. Not so with 
definite descriptions, except in the special cases in which they are 'incomplete'. Insofar 
as they are special, such cases should be left aside in theorizing about descriptions. 
 There are two distinguishable elements in this anti-referentialist response to the 
similarity-with-pronouns argument. First, there is the implicit observation that only 
certain uses of definite descriptions are intuitively 'referential' (i.e. involve an act of 
reference on the speaker's part and an act of re-identification on the hearer's part). I will 
deal with that observation below. It raises a serious problem for the referentialist, 
though perhaps not an insuperable one. The other aspect of the anti-referentialist reply 
is the idea that incomplete definite descriptions are too 'special' to be considered in 
theorizing about descriptions. That part of the anti-referentialist reply is clearly not 
acceptable. There is nothing abnormal about incomplete descriptions; indeed most 
descriptions are incomplete. Just as the descriptive condition associated with a 
referential term may or may not be uniquely identifying (recall the difference between 
'I' and 'she'), the descriptive condition associated with a definite description may or may 
not be uniquely identifying. It would be question-begging to argue that incomplete 
descriptions (i.e. those descriptions whose descriptive condition is not uniquely-
identifying) are somehow deviant, and that only complete descriptions matter to 
semantic theory. 
 The main argument in favour of a referential treatment of (certain uses of) 
definite descriptions is precisely the availability of an account of incomplete definite 
descriptions within that framework (Kripke 1977, Wettstein 1981). That is the 
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incompleteness argument. If definite descriptions are referential, it does not matter that 
sometimes the descriptive condition per se is not uniquely-identifying; for we can rely 
on the speaker's act of reference to provide a unique candidate for the status of semantic 
referent. To say that a description is referential is to say that its denotation is fixed by 
the pragmatic-cum- descriptive condition, rather than by the descriptive condition 
alone. On the other hand, if we do not treat the description as referential, we are left in a 
quandary.  An incomplete description is such that the descriptive condition, by itself, is 
not uniquely identifying. How, then, can its denotation be determined? That is the 
problem which incomplete descriptions raise for nonreferentialist accounts. Various 
solutions to this problem will be discussed below (section 2). 
 Before evaluating these two arguments in favour of the referential analysis, let 
us briefly consider the main argument against it — an argument I've already alluded to. 
We may call it the 'lack-of-generality argument': 
 
(Lack-of-generality argument) 
The  referential analysis imposes an act of reference to the denotatum on the speaker's 
part, and a correlative act of re-identification of the denotatum on the hearer's part. Yet 
there are many cases in which a description is used but no such acts take place (nor are 
required). As Donnellan pointed out, descriptions may be used attributively, in such a 
way that a general rather than a singular proposition is expressed. Such nonreferential 
uses of definite descriptions are clear counterexamples to the referential analysis. 
 
 Is this argument compelling? That is unclear. After all, pronouns themselves 
have distinct uses: they can be used referentially (deictically), but they also have bound 
uses and anaphoric uses. Why not, then, accept for descriptions what we accept for 
pronouns, namely, that they have a deictic use, distinct from their other uses? If we are 
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prepared to endorse an ambiguity thesis regarding pronouns, we should be prepared to 
endorse it also regarding descriptions. Note that Strawson himself acknowledged the 
existence of nonreferential uses of descriptions (as in 'The whale is a mammal'); but he 
did not feel compelled to give up the referential treatment, because he questioned the 
need for a genuinely unified semantic analysis. 
 Still, I think it should be conceded to the anti-referentialist that a unified 
analysis of descriptions is preferable, ceteris paribus, to a non-unified analysis. The 
same thing holds for pronouns, of course. On the other hand, the referentialist should be 
granted his first point: An analysis which does justice to the striking similarities 
between pronouns and descriptions is preferable, ceteris paribus, to an analysis which 
treats them as illusory.
iii
 The problem is that these two desiderata may (and actually do) 
enter into conflict. Many philosophers hold that a unified, nonreferential analysis of 
descriptions is available, typically an analysis along Russellian lines completed by 
Gricean considerations. In virtue of the first desideratum, such an analysis should be 
preferred to the sort of view defended by either Strawson or Donnellan. But it does not 
satisfy the second desideratum: the referentiality of descriptions is treated as a 
pragmatic illusion, while the referentiality of pronouns is treated as a genuine semantic 
fact. As Schiffer pointed out, this difference of treatment is worrisome, given the 
similarity between the cases. 
 Let us now evaluate the two referentialist arguments. I have just said that I grant 
the referentialist his first point: deictic pronouns and referential descriptions should be 
treated more or less on a par. This argument cuts both ways, however. The analogy 
between pronouns and descriptions can be interpreted as supporting a descriptive 
treatment of pronouns, as much as a referential treatment of descriptions. For example, 
we might equate the pronoun 'she' with an incomplete description such as: 'the female', 
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and analyse that description within the unified, Russellian-cum-Gricean framework (or 
whichever unified framework is used for the analysis of definite descriptions). 
 This immediately leads us back to the main argument in favour of a referential 
analysis of descriptions: the argument from incompleteness. How are we to treat an 
incomplete description such as 'the female' if we do not accept the referential analysis? 
Everything turns out to hinge upon that argument. If we analyse the argument, however, 
we see that it involves two distinct claims, one of which can be disputed: 
 
First claim: 
Incompleteness raises a deep problem for descriptive (nonreferential) approaches. 
Second claim: 
The problem of incompleteness does not arise in a referentialist framework. 
 
The first claim seems to me undoubtedly true, but I reject the second one as false. The 
problem of incompleteness still arises within a referentialist framework (Neale 1990: 
98-100). It follows that we cannot legitimately use the incompleteness problem as an 
argument in favour of the referential analysis. 
 There are two reasons why the problem of incompleteness still arises in a 
referentialist framework. First, among incomplete definite descriptions, some are 
clearly attributive, as when the speaker discovers Smith's horribly mutilated body and 
exclaims: 'The murderer is insane!' Faced with this apparent counterexample to the 
referentialist approach, Wettstein maintains that, in this as in the other cases, the 
incomplete description is completed by an act of demonstrative reference (to the 
corpse). That is an interesting claim yet, appearances notwithstanding, it is irrelevant to 
the issue at stake. Even if Wettstein is right and an incomplete description is always 
completed through an act of demonstrative reference, that need not be an act of 
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reference to the description's referent. In the murderer example, the speaker refers to 
Smith's mutilated body. What makes that occurrence of the description attributive is 
precisely the fact that the speaker does not refer to but merely describes the denotatum. 
The fact that the speaker refers to something else is irrelevant. (The sort of position 
which Wettstein's observation actually supports I call 'quasi-referentialism'. According 
to quasi-referentialism, what enables us to complete a definite description is an act of 
demonstrative reference, though not necessarily an act of reference to the denotatum. A 
particular version of quasi-referentialism, namely situational referentialism, will be 
discussed in section 3.) 
 The second reason why referentialism does not solve the incompleteness 
problem is that, as we all know, the phenomenon of incompleteness concerns not only 
descriptions, but also quantifiers. When I say 'Everybody failed', the quantifier is 
obviously incomplete. (I do not mean that everybody in the world failed.) The 
referentialist view does not apply in a case like this. The quantifier must be completed, 
and that may involve reference to e.g. a particular group of students, such that the 
speaker means that everybody in that group failed; but the speaker does not refer to the 
actual persons who failed. 
 I conclude that the two arguments in favour of referentialism — the similarity-
with-pronouns argument and the incompleteness argument — actually fail to support 
that position. What we need is something which referentialism does not provide, 
namely, an account meeting the following three desiderata: (i) the account must be 
semantically unified, (ii) it must capture the striking similarities between pronouns and 
descriptions, and (iii) it must solve the incompleteness problem. In this paper I am 
mainly concerned with (iii), but I will keep an eye on (i) and (ii). 
 
II. Incompleteness and indeterminacy 
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If we give up the referentialist analysis, how can we account for description 
incompleteness? In a referentialist framework uniqueness pertains to the act of 
reference performed by the speaker. The semantic referent is not the unique F 
simpliciter, but the unique F referred to by the speaker. In a non-referentialist 
framework, we must say that the descriptive condition F, by itself, determines the 
semantic referent. The semantic referent will be the unique satisfier of that condition, as 
in Frege's theory. The problem is that, whenever the description is incomplete, there is 
no unique satisfier (by definition). Three main solutions to this problem have been put 
forward in the literature: 
 
(i) We can bite the bullet and treat all incomplete descriptions as defective 
(nondenoting).  
(ii) We can treat incomplete descriptions as elliptical for the appropriately completed 
descriptions. For example, 'the table' will be understood as: the table of the living-room, 
the table which Aunt Martha gave us, or possibly the table there. 
(iii) We can insist that the descriptive condition associated with incomplete definite 
descriptions is uniquely-identifying. I said above that it is non-uniquely-identifying 'by 
definition'. Still it can be argued that it becomes uniquely-identifying if we 
appropriately restrict the domain of discourse. What is true by definition is only this: 
the descriptive condition associated with incomplete definite descriptions is non-
uniquely-identifying in the total world. But it may well be uniquely-identifying in a 
partial situation. 
 
 If we choose the first option, we face a problem: we must account for the clear 
intuition that utterances such as 'The table is covered with books' can be true. The 
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problem can be put in general terms. By treating incomplete descriptions as 
nondenoting, we introduce a gap between the deliverances of semantic theory and 
ordinary truth-conditional intuitions; a gap which it is then incumbent upon pragmatic 
theory to reduce. In previous writings I argued that the gap in question should be kept 
as narrow as possible. That means that, other things being equal, we should prefer 
semantic theories which minimize the gap, over theories which widen it. It follows that 
the option I have just mentioned should be seriously considered only if every other 
reasonable attempt fails. (It will not be considered in the rest of this paper.) 
 Option (iii) I find most promising. The descriptive condition associated with an 
incomplete description such as 'the woman' becomes uniquely identifying if we restrict 
the domain, for example, if we focus on the perceptual scene. That is very similar to the 
phenomenon of demonstrative reference: we look at the scene before us, and are 
thereby related to various perceived individuals — say, a man and a woman — whose 
behaviour we monitor through our continuous perception of the scene. The non-
uniquely-identifying descriptive condition associated with the description 'the woman' 
suffices, within the domain of objects thus singled out, to make the hearer understand 
which object is in question. Domain restriction, in such a case, proceeds through 
something like demonstrative reference to a global situation. Option (iii) is therefore 
compatible with a quasi-referentialist approach, according to which incomplete 
descriptions (or incomplete quantifiers) are completed via an act of reference on the 
speaker's part (and a correlative act of identification on the hearer's part). On the 
particular version I call situational referentialism, the entity tacitly referred to is a 
partial situation with respect to which the descriptive condition F happens to be 
uniquely-identifying (section 3). 
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 Option (ii) is probably the most popular and it too is compatible with a quasi-
referentialist approach. In the rest of this section I will discuss that option and try to 
make clear why I think option (iii) is, on the whole, preferable. 
 Option (ii) can be interpreted in several ways. The 'ellipsis' at issue can be 
construed either as syntactic ellipsis in the strict, grammatical sense or as ellipsis only 
in a loose, semantic sense. In previous papers (Recanati 1989, 1996) I argued against 
the ellipsis approach construed in the strict, grammatical sense. I have the feeling that 
most theorists nowadays consider such a theory as preposterous and hardly worthy of a 
serious reply (see the collection of papers in Mind and Language 15:2-3, 2000).
iv
 Let 
us therefore ignore it and consider only a semantic, non-syntactic construal of the 
ellipsis theory. On such a construal, the sentence 'The table is covered with books' is not 
syntactically elliptical for another, more complete sentence, but the statement which the 
speaker makes by uttering this sentence involves a contextually provided property of 
the table, which property enriches the matrix of the description (analysed à la Russell-
Neale): 'the x: Fx' is contextually enriched into 'the x: Fx & Hx'.
v
 
 A well-known problem with the ellipsis theory is that it is indeterminate which 
completion the speaker has in mind. That problem arises at several levels. To see that 
let us distinguish three things: 
 
- o, the reference or denotatum (an object); 
- P, some uniquely-identifying property of o through which it is singled out, and which 
provides the (contextual) sense of the description; 
- , some linguistic expression explicitly expressing P. 
 
If one opts for a syntactic version of the ellipsis theory, it will be indeterminate which 
among many different, possibly synonymous sentences the elliptical sentence is 
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elliptical for. Even if we fix the property P which is used to uniquely-identify o, still it 
is indeterminate which expression  expressing P the incomplete description is 
elliptical for. Is 'the table' elliptical for 'the table which Aunt Martha bequeathed us' or 
'the table we inherited from Martha'? By opting for a semantic version, we suppress that 
source of indeterminacy: the same property P is involved in both cases, and that is all 
that matters. But there remains a major source of indeterminacy: a great number of 
distinct, uniquely-identifying properties P1, P2, P3 etc. can be invoked to render the 
description complete. Which one is the right one? As Wettstein argued, there is no 
principled answer to that question, hence the ellipsis theory cannot be right: 
 
When one says, for example, ‘The table is covered with books,’ the table the 
speaker has in mind can be more fully described in any number of ways, by the 
use of any number of nonsynonymous, uniquely denoting descriptions (for 
example, 'the table in room 209 of Camden Hall at t1', 'the table at which the 
author of The Persistence of Objects is sitting at t1', etc.)... It might be supposed 
that we could decide on one of these Russellian descriptions as the correct one 
by reference to the intentions of the speaker. In many cases, however, the 
speaker will have no such determinate intention. (Wettstein 1981: 41-42) 
 
 In defense of the ellipsis theory, several philosophers have argued as follows.
vi
 
Let us use a referential completer instead of a descriptive completer. For example in the 
murderer case, let us follow Wettstein and say that the description is completed by a 
demonstratively given individual (the victim). The description 'the murderer' encodes a 
two place relation, 'murderer-of', the second argument-place of which is filled by the 
demonstrated individual, namely Smith. That individual is not described, he is 
demonstratively given; hence the problem of the plurality of nonsynonymous, 
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codenoting descriptions does not arise. The trick consists in moving from the level of 
sense to the level of reference so as to bypass the problem of the multiplicity of 
potential senses. 
 When it comes to other, nonrelational examples ('the woman', 'the table'), the 
same sort of solution can be appealed to — or so it is argued. All the completions 
mentioned by Wettstein in connection with the incomplete description 'the table' (e.g. 
'in room 209 of Camden Hall at t
1
', 'at which the author of The Persistence of Objects is 
sitting at t
1
') are descriptive, but we can also think of demonstrative completions like: 
'over there'. Thus 'The x: x is a table' can be enriched into: 'The x: x is a table and x is 
there', or into 'The x: x is a table and x = that'. Since demonstratives are directly 
referential, what completes the content of the description in such cases is a place in 
egocentric space or an object (the table itself). In this way, it is claimed, we avoid the 
indeterminacy problem. The completion takes place at the level of reference, not at the 
level of sense; hence the problem of the plurality of potential senses does not arise. 
 This alleged solution to the indeterminacy problem rests on a confusion, due to 
an ambiguity in the very notion of a 'referential completer'. A referential completer is 
meant to be a worldly entity — e.g. an object or a place. That is required for the 
argument to go through. Such completing entities are indeed involved in what I called 
demonstrative completions; but they do not do the completing by themselves. If by 
'referential completer' we mean what really does the completing, then a referential 
completer is not an object, but an object-dependent property. Once we see that, 
however, we realize that the indeterminacy problem has not been solved. 
 Except perhaps in special cases where there arguably is an 'implicit argument' 
(as in 'the murderer'), we need a relation to bridge the gap between the incomplete 
description and the completing entity. In the table example, we need the 
LOCATED_AT relation if the completing entity is a place, and we need the identity 
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relation if it is the table itself. Like the completing entity, the bridging relation is 
contextually provided. Together with the completing entity, it determines a 
(demonstrative) property of the denotatum which is what putatively completes the 
incomplete description: the property of being identical with that (where that = the table 
in question) or the property of being located there (where there = the location of the 
table in question). Now there is absolutely no reason to think that we can get rid of 
indeterminacy by using such completers. For it is still indeterminate which completing 
demonstrative property H is contextually provided: the property of being there, the 
property of being this object, the property of being in front of me, or whatnot. I 
conclude that the appeal to demonstrative completions does not meet the indeterminacy 
objection which besets the ellipsis approach. We have not really moved from the level 
of sense to the level of reference. Demonstrative, object-involving properties such as 
those mentioned in connection with the table example determine possible contextual 
senses for the incomplete description, and there are many potential senses of that sort, 
just as there are many potential descriptive senses. 
 Another solution to the indeterminacy problem has been put forward in the 
literature. It consists in biting the bullet and accepting the indeterminate nature of the 
contextual completion (Blackburn 1988, Schiffer 1997). It is a fact that, in a normal 
situation of utterance, there will often be a collection of potential and equally legitimate 
completers for a given incomplete description. Insofar as the speaker does not have one 
of them in mind to the exclusion of the others, the proposition expressed by the 
utterance, 'The F is G', will be somewhat indeterminate; but this does not prevent us 
from ascribing definite truth-conditions to it, using supervaluation techniques. We can 
say that the utterance is true iff all the potential completions are true, false iff all the 
potential completions are false, and unevaluable otherwise. 
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 For that solution to work we must be given a set of potential completers. At this 
point, an advocate of the quasi-referential account may argue as follows. Such a set, 
hence the truth-conditions of the utterance, can be established only as a side effect of an 
act of reference. Typically, the potential completers will correspond to salient 
properties of the denotatum in the context at hand. The properties in question are made 
available through the speaker's act of demonstrative reference to the denotatum, hence 
the referentialist viewpoint is vindicated: what completes the description and enables 
the hearer to overcome the non-uniquely-identifying character of the descriptive 
condition is the speaker's act of reference which gives us access to the denotatum and 
its properties, hence to several potential completers.
vii
 If the description is not used 
referentially, still, as Wettstein pointed out, something is referred to, which determines 
a set of potential completers. In the murderer example, what is demonstratively given is 
a certain object — Smith's body — in a certain state, which state presumably results 
from someone's action. The action itself has several facets and can be described both as 
a killing and as a mutilating. The object, the state, and its presumed etiology are among 
the aspects of a complex, holistic situation which determines the set of potential 
completers for the incomplete description 'the murderer'. The murderer is the person 
who did the killing; but he is also, presumably, the person who did the mutilating. The 
description can be understood not only as 'the person who murdered Smith' but also, 
still more explicitly, as 'the person who murdered Smith and savagely mutilated his 
body', or perhaps as 'the person who broke into the house, murdered Smith and savagely 
mutilated his body'. As soon as we are allowed to enrich the description with 
contextually provided properties, several, equally legitimate enrichments spring to 
mind. To meet the indeterminacy objection, we can supplement the ellipsis theory with 
an appeal to vagueness and supervaluation; but again, this presupposes that a set of 
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potential completers is somehow given, and it is given only through some form of 
reference to a complex, holistic situation. 
 In the next section we shall see that the quasi-referentialist view cannot be 
maintained. What matters to my present purposes is not the quasi-referentialist view, 
however, but rather the need to appeal to something in order to account for the 
provision of a set of completers. The ellipsis-cum-vagueness theory presupposes that a 
set of completers is somehow given. My claim has been that such a set is given only 
against a certain background, namely, with respect to a situation in which the 
denotatum is involved. In the relevant situation the denotatum has properties and stands 
in relation to other objects. Those features of the denotatum which happen to be 
instantiated in the situation at issue determine the set of the potential completers for the 
description. The plurality of potential completers therefore corresponds to the internal 
complexity and the holistic character of the focus situation. (On this analysis the 
referential use of a description falls out as a special case: the case where the focus 
situation is demonstratively given and the denotatum itself is demonstratively given as 
part of the situation in question. Thus when I see a man and a woman quarelling and I 
say 'The woman is vulgar', the set of completers for the description is determined by the 
perceived situation. In such a case, there is demonstrative reference both to the 
deictically given situation and to the denotatum who centrally features in it.) 
 Now the reason we have for preferring option (iii) to option (ii) can be stated 
quite simply: we need a focus situation to determine the set of completers which the 
ellipsis-cum-vagueness theory requires in order to run its supervaluations. Once 
available, however, the situation in question can be used directly to complete the 
description, by providing a restricted domain with respect to which the descriptive 
condition happens to be uniquely-identifying. Hence there is no need to go into the 
complications of the ellipsis-cum-vagueness theory.
viii
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III. Situational referentialism 
 
From what I have said it follows that definite descriptions do not constrain the context 
(the situation of utterance), as referential terms do; rather, they constrain an arbitrary 
focus situation which may but need not be the situation of utterance. If I say 'I am bald', 
the denotatum (the person who is said to be bald) must be speaking in the situation of 
utterance. But if I say 'the President is bald', the denotatum need not be President in the 
situation of utterance. He may be President in a remote situation (e.g. a distant country) 
which simply happens to be the topic of the current conversation. 
 According to what I call situational referentialism (a particular version of the 
quasi-referential approach), the denotatum need not be referred to, but at least the 
situation in which it is to be found (the focus situation) must be referred to. Is that 
right?  Undoubtedly, there are cases in which the relevant situation is demonstratively 
given. In the example I used several times, the speaker and the hearer witness a scene in 
which there is a man and a woman. The situation is perceptually accessible, and the 
reference of the description 'the woman', qua constituent in that situation, is also 
perceptually accessible. That is characteristic of referential uses of definite descriptions. 
In other cases, a situation is demonstratively given, but we need to extend it beyond 
what is demonstratively given in order to secure a referent for the description. Thus, in 
the murderer example, we need to go beyond the demonstratively given situation s1 (a 
situation in which Smith lies dead and horribly mutilated) and extend it by considering 
another, temporally prior situation s2 having s1 as one of its effects. Situation s2 is the 
killing and mutilating of Smith by someone — the murderer. As the murderer is to be 
found in s2, but not in s1, we must go from the demonstratively given s1 to its hidden 
cause s2 to evaluate the description. So there is a form of demonstrative reference in 
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that example, as Wettstein stressed, but it can be argued that it is neither a reference to 
the denotatum, nor even a reference to the situation in which the denotatum is to be 
found, namely s2. It is a reference to another, causally related situation, namely s1. This 
provides a prima facie counterexample to situational referentialism (s-referentialism, 
for short). 
 On the basis of that and similar counterexamples a refutation of situational 
referentialism can be attempted. The argument runs as follows: 
 
1. One cannot demonstratively refer to a situation without demonstratively referring to 
its constituents. (Assumption) 
2. The denotatum is a constituent of the focus situation. (Since the focus situation is, by 
definition, the situation where the denotatum is to be found.) 
3. It follows that one cannot refer to the focus situation without referring to the 
denotatum. 
4. Therefore, if the focus situation is always referred to, as situational referentialism 
claims, the denotatum also is always referred to, and no attributive (nonreferential) use 
of incomplete descriptions is possible. 
5. But it is a fact that there are attributive uses of incomplete descriptions (as in the 
murderer example). 
6. It follows that the focus situation is not always referred to: hence situational 
referentialism is false. 
 
 Faced with the alleged counterexample and the alleged refutation, the situational 
referentialist has an easy reply. Assumption 1 can and should be denied. Just as one can 
perceive a complex object without perceiving all its parts (e.g. I can perceive a cow 
without perceiving its tail), one can perceive or demonstratively refer to a situation 
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without perceiving or demonstratively referring to all its constituents. That is arguably 
what happens in the alleged counterexample to situational referentialism — the 
murderer example. Let us re-analyse that example as follows. The speaker and hearer 
are perceptually confronted with a situation in which Smith is dead and mutilated. That 
is situation s1. The relevant focus situation is not s1 but an extension of s1  
incorporating the event s2 that caused s1. Let us dub that extension s3. Situation s3 
contains both s1 and s2 as proper parts. It is demonstratively given since its proper part 
s1 is, just as the cow is perceptually available as soon as a relevant portion of the cow 
is. And just as the perceptual availability of the cow does not entail the perceptual 
availability of all its parts (e.g. its tail), there are aspects of the demonstratively given 
situation s3 which are not demonstratively given. In particular, the temporally anterior 
portion of s3, namely s2, is not demonstratively given; and it is in that portion that the 
denotatum (the murderer) is to be found. 
 Of course, it may be deemed arbitrary to claim that the focus situation is s3 
rather than s2. But that option is not ruled out, and that is sufficient to dispose of the 
alleged counterexample to situational referentialism. 
 In another important class of alleged counterexamples, the relevant situation is 
mentioned in the discourse — it is given linguistically rather than extralinguistically. 
Anaphoric uses of definite descriptions such as (1) fall in that category. 
 
(1) I met a child and a woman in Lyon the other day. The woman gave me her 
newspaper. 
 
The situation relevant to the evaluation of the description 'the woman' in the second 
sentence is the situation described by the first sentence: a particular event in the life of 
the speaker, namely his meeting a child and a woman in Lyon the other day. 'The 
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woman' denotes the unique woman in that situation. Since the focus situation is 
described rather than demonstratively referred to, this type of case constitutes another 
alleged counterexample to situational referentialism.
ix
  
 But that type of counterexample is not convincing either. According to John 
Austin (1950), when we say things like 'I met a child and a woman in Lyon the other 
day', we do two things: we refer to a historic situation via the demonstrative 
components of the sentence (e.g. the past tense, the name 'Lyon' etc.), and we describe 
that situation as a situation of a certain type (involving a man and a woman etc.). There 
are various ways of implementing Austin's proposal (Recanati 1999: 113-115), but as 
soon as we accept the basic framework we can no longer say that the situation which 
serves as focus situation for the next sentence is merely described. In the Austinian 
framework the first sentence both describes and refers to the situation in question. 
Hence anaphoric uses of descriptions do not constitute a counterexample to situational 
referentialism. 
 The Austinian reply itself can be found unconvincing. If the speaker refers to a 
historic, real situation, how can we be sure that that situation did not involve several 
women, even if the speaker, in his description of the situation, mentions only one? 
Assume, for example, that the speaker met the child and the woman in the train station. 
Presumably, there were other women around, which the speaker may or may not have 
noticed. The uniqueness implication conveyed by the description 'the woman' in the 
subsequent sentence therefore suggests that the completing situation is not the real 
situation (with all its complexity, including passing women in the background), but 
rather the situation as described by the previous sentence. Only in that situation will the 
woman be suitably unique (since the speaker mentioned only one woman). But if we so 
construe the focus situation, the Austinian response on behalf of situational 
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referentialism is no longer available: we can no longer say that the focus situation is 
referred to rather than merely described. 
 The situational referentialist can make the following reply. The historic situation 
s1 in which the meeting took place is complex and different sub-situations can be 
discerned within it. Arguably, the focus situation tacitly referred to by the speaker when 
he utters the incomplete description 'the woman' is not s1  in its entirety but a sub-
situation s2 contained in s1: a minimal sub-situation satisfying the description the 
speaker makes of s1, that is, a minimal sub-situation s2 ≤ s1 in which the speaker meets 
a child and a woman. In that minimal sub-situation s2, there is only one woman.
x
 
 That is not the end of the discussion. Suppose the speaker is a woman. In the 
minimal sub-situation s2 there will be two women, namely the speaker and the woman 
she met. Yet the definite description 'the woman' still carries a suggestion of 
uniqueness. What are we to do to solve this difficulty? I have no definite answer to that 
question, but I am confident that ingenious solutions have been, are being or will be 
devised, and I conclude that anaphoric cases such as (1) provide no decisive 
counterexample to s-referentialism. 
 That is not to say that there are no decisive counterexamples. I think there are 
plenty of them. Often, the relevant situation is not 'given' at all, whether linguistically or 
extralinguistically. Rather, the speaker quantifies over situations of the relevant type. 
Thus she can say: 
 
(2) Whenever I go to Lyon by train, the controller is a woman. 
 
Here the situation with respect to which the description 'the controller' is to be 
evaluated is not singled out uniquely, by whatever means. The speaker universally 
quantifies over situations in which she goes to Lyon by train. Each particular 
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assignment of value to the quantified variable (each train trip to Lyon) provides a 
domain of objects in which there is a unique controller, but none is singled out in 
particular. This sort of case constitutes a decisive counterexample to situational 
referentialism and, presumably, to the quasi-referentialist project of showing that 
incomplete descriptions are always completed through an act of reference. 
 Just as there may be tacit as well as explicit reference to the relevant situation, 
there may be tacit as well as explicit quantification over situations. In one reading of 
 
(3) The President lives in the White House 
 
there is implicit universal quantification over a certain sort of situations which we may 
call 'US situations'. In all such situations s, whoever is the President in s lives in the 
White House. (Below I shall represent such cases by enclosing the implicit quantifier 
within angle brackets instead of square brackets.) If, instead, the speaker refers to the 
actual US situation, in which Bush is president, (3) gets another reading. Note that the 
'referential' interpretation is not mandatory, even on that reading. We may tacitly refer 
to the current situation and say of whoever is the President in that situation that he lives 
in the White House. Although nonreferential (as far as the denotatum is concerned) that 
interpretation is quite different from the 'generic' reading, in which we tacitly quantify 
over situations.
xi
 
 In an important class of examples, often discussed in the recent literature 
(Stanley and Szabo 2000, Bach 2000, Lepore 2003), there is explicit quantification over 
objects, and a correlative, albeit implicit, quantification over situations. Thus Kuroda 
gives this example from Japanese (1982: 48-49): 
 
(4) 
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subete no kyoozyu-ga gakusei-o minna rakudai-saseta 
all professor-SUBJ student-OBJ all flunked 
 
In French, this would be translated as: 
 
Tous les professeurs ont recalé tous les étudiants 
(Literally: All the professors flunked all the students) 
 
Like the Japanese sentence, the French sentence is ambiguous. Among its possible 
readings there is the following: every professor flunked all of his/her students. Here 
each professor x determines a situation f(x): the teaching situation involving that 
professor and his or her students. It is the teaching situation f(x) which serves to 
evaluate the quantifier 'all the students': every professor x flunked all the students in the 
situation f(x). The situations in question are (implicitly) quantified over, as a result of 
(explicitly) quantifying over the arguments to the (unarticulated) function f from 
professors to situations. 
 Finally, we should take notice of a group of cases which possess features in 
common with all the examples discussed so far: 
 
(5) Each time I go to Lyon, I meet a woman and a child. The woman gives me her 
newspaper and I thank her for her kindness. 
 
Let us focus on the interpretation in which the indefinite descriptions in the first 
sentence take narrow scope, in such a way that, like the controller in example (2), the 
woman-child pair can be different for each trip to Lyon. As in (1), the definite 
description 'the woman' in the second sentence of (5) is evaluated with respect to some 
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situation(s) introduced in the first sentence, namely the (minimal) situation(s) in which 
the speaker goes to Lyon and meets a woman and a child. Here, however, it is clear that 
the speaker does not refer to the historic situation in which he meets a woman and a 
child; he quantifies over such situations without singling out any particular one of them. 
That is similar to (2), except for the following feature: in (2), the description 'the 
controller' is evaluated with respect to a range of situations introduced by the universal 
quantifier 'Everytime I go to Lyon by train', and it occurs within the scope of that 
quantifier. Hence it can be suggested that some form of 'binding' occurs (see section 4 
below). But in (5) the description does not occur within the scope of the quantifier. If, 
therefore, we think that some form of binding takes place even in (5), we must posit an 
implicit quantifier in that example just as we did for examples (3) and (4). I will argue 
that, in the second sentence of (5), there is an implicit quantification over situations 
which is parasitic on the explicit quantification over situations that takes place in the 
first sentence.  
 
IV. Explicit and implicit binding of situational variables 
 
It is often said that the completion problem concerns quantifiers in general, and 
descriptions as a special case (since descriptions themselves can be construed as 
quantifiers — a view which I accept). The treatment in terms of situations seems to 
support such a view. In Recanati 2000 I offered the following picture: a situation is a 
portion of the world which determines a set of facts — the facts which hold in the 
situation. Each fact consists of a n-place relation and a sequence of n arguments. The 
domain of a situation is the set of objects that are constituents of some fact holding in 
the situation. Often the domain of discourse is restricted to the domain of the situation 
which happens to be in focus. When we say 'Everybody came', we mean that everybody 
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in the relevant situation s came. ('Everybody in situation s' means: every person who 
belongs to the domain of s, that is, every person who is a constituent of some fact in the 
'factual set' of s.) Situations thus provide a restricted domain of discourse, over which 
quantifiers can range. 
 Still, I think it is a mistake to view situational completion as primarily 
concerning quantifiers. Situational completion primarily concerns predicates. In a 
standard conception, predicates denote sets of objects, and quantifiers denote relations 
between sets of objects. In 'Every F is G', 'every' denotes that relation which holds 
between the set of Fs and the set of Gs just in case the former is included in the latter. 
In 'The F is G', 'the' similarly denotes a certain relation between the set of Fs and the set 
of Gs, namely the relation which holds just in case {F} = 1 and {F}  {G}. In both 
cases the completion problem arises because predicates denote sets of objects only 
relative to situations; hence before we can evaluate a quantificational statement we 
must evaluate the predicates with respect to situations so as to determine the sets of 
objects which serve as arguments to the quantifier. 
 When I say that predicates denote sets of objects only relative to situations, I 
intend this as a rather trivial point. Some objects are red in a given situation, which may 
no longer be red in a different (say, temporally posterior) situation. So the set of red 
objects is variable and depends upon the situation at stake, even if we do not vary the 
domain from one situation to the next. There may be properties which stick to their 
objects in the sense that, if an object has them in a situation, it must have them in any 
situation to the domain of which that object belongs. Even if there are such sticking 
properties, still the predicates which correspond to them will possibly denote different 
sets of objects in different situations because the domain of objects itself can vary from 
one situation to another. 
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 So predicates require situations for their evaluation. The same thing holds for 
sentences. Whether a sentence is true or false depends upon how things are in the 
relevant circumstance of evaluation. When a sentence is asserted in isolation, the 
circumstance of evaluation is determined pragmatically. That pragmatically determined 
circumstance of evaluation I call the exercised situation — the situation with respect to 
which the speaker intends his utterance to be evaluated. The circumstance of evaluation 
for a given sentence may also be determined linguistically, by prefixing that sentence 
with a situation-indicator. In such a case, the circumstance of evaluation for the 
sentence is determined by the nearest situation-indicator above it. For example, if we 
analyse the sentence 'It will rain' as 'It will be the case that + it rains', we shall say that 
that sentence is true in a situation s iff there is a situation s' temporally posterior to s 
such that the embedded sentence 'it rains' is true in s'. The situations relevant to the 
evaluation of the embedded sentence 'it rains' are determined by the temporal operator 
'it will be the case that' right above that sentence. 
 Whether or not a sentence occurs in isolation, the main predicate in that 
sentence — the predicate which corresponds to the topmost verb-phrase — is always 
evaluated with respect to the circumstance of evaluation for the sentence in question. 
Consider the simple sentence: 'Every student laughs'. There is simply no possibility of a 
divergence between the situation with respect to which the sentence is evaluated and 
the situation with respect to which the main predicate, 'laughs', is evaluated. That means 
that, if the sentence is asserted in isolation and evaluated with respect to some exercised 
situation s, the set of laughers which serves as second argument to the quantifier 'every' 
will be the set of laughers-in-s. In contrast, the predicate which occurs as part of the 
noun-phrase, 'student', can be evaluated with respect to any situation: it may be the 
exercised situation s (in which case every student-in-s is said to be among the laughers-
in-s), it may be the situation of utterance c (in which case every student-in-c is said to 
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be among the laughers-in-s), or it may be any auxiliary situation which happens to be 
sufficiently salient for either linguistic or extralinguistic reasons.
xii
 
 In line with what has been said, we can adopt a notation inspired from Kuroda's 
'indexed predicate calculus' (Kuroda 1982) and associate a free situational variable with 
each noun-phrase predicate. Such a variable can be pragmatically assigned a value in 
context, but it can also be semantically bound, as in the examples I gave in the previous 
section: 
 
(2) Whenever I go to Lyon by train, the controller is a woman. 
 
Here the main clause 'the controller is a woman' is evaluated with respect to the 
situations introduced by the situation-indicator 'whenever I go to Lyon' (construed as a 
universal quantifier over situations of a certain type.) The noun-phrase predicate, 
'controller', is associated with a situational variable which can be assigned any value, 
but which can also be bound by the quantifier, as in the most natural reading of (2): 
 
[Every s: in s, I go to Lyon by train] [the x: controllers (x)] (woman (x))
xiii
 
 
 As I pointed out, situational binding can also be implicit. Thus I represent 
example (3), on its generic interpretation, as follows. (Implicit quantifiers occur within 
angle brackets instead of square brackets.) 
 
<Every s: US-situation (s)> [the x: Presidents (x)] (x lives in the White House) 
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 The most interesting cases of that sort are those in which the implicit 
quantification over situations is parasitic on some explicit quantification, as in (one 
reading of) Kuroda's Japanese example: 
 
(4) Every professor flunked all the students [i.e. all of his or her students] 
 
While the situational variable associated with the noun 'professor' remains free and 
must be pragmatically assigned a value, that associated with the noun 'student' is 
indirectly bound by the quantifier 'every professor': the situations which fill the extra 
argument place associated with the predicate 'student' are the values of the implicit 
function f from professors to teaching situations, hence they covary with the professors. 
Kuroda represents this reading of (4) straightforwardly as (4a), where a functional 
expression 'f(x)' is used instead of a situational variable to complete the predicate 
'student': 
 
(4a) [Every x: professors (x)] [Every y: studentf(x) (y)] (flunked (x, y)) 
 
In order to provide a unified semantic analysis, Stanley and Szabo (2000) generalize 
that sort of move: they systematically replace situational variables by ordered pairs of 
an objectual variable and a higher-level function variable. Relative to a context, the 
higher-level function variable is assigned a function from objects to quantifier domains 
(sets), while the other variable is assigned an object. In this framework (4) will be 
analysed as 
 
[Every x: professorg(z) (x)] [Every y: studentf(x) (y)] (flunked (x, y)) 
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Here, the object variable 'z' will be contextually assigned a certain school, and the 
function variable 'g' the function mapping schools to the set of people working for 
them. The set denoted by 'professorg(z)' under this assignment is the set of professors in 
school z. As for the other noun, 'student', the associated function variable will be 
assigned, as in Kuroda's treatment, the function mapping professors to the set of 
students in their class. Since the object variable 'x' is bound by the initial quantifier 
'every x: professorg(z) (x)', different sets of students will be denoted by 'studentf(x)' 
relative to different assignments of values to the quantified variable 'x': for each 
professor x, 'studentf(x)' will denote the set of students in that professor's class. 
 Stanley's and Szabo's proposal complicates the picture by forcing us to introduce 
a pair of an objectual variable and a higher-level function variable even when we could 
directly relativize a predicate to a given situation. This is OK if the complication is 
necessary to achieve a uniform analysis, but in the present case the complication seems 
to me unnecessary. If we acknowledge the phenomenon of implicit quantification, as 
we clearly should, then we can use straight situational variables and represent (4) as 
follows. 
 
[Every x: professors (x)] <Everys': s' = f(x)> [Every y: students' (y)] (flunked (x, y)) 
 
The situational variable associated with the noun 'student' is bound by the implicit 
quantifier 'everys': s' = f(x)', which itself contains an occurrence of the objectual 
variable 'x' bound by the initial quantifier 'every x: professors (x)'. In this way the 
indirect binding of situational variables by objectual quantifiers is accounted for. 
 In the previous section I sketched an analysis of (5) along similar lines and I 
want to pursue it here. There are two sentences in (5): 
  
32 
32 
 
(5) a. Each time I go to Lyon, I meet a woman and a child. 
 b. The woman gives me her newspaper. 
 
The first sentence, (5a), explicitly quantifies over situations: it says that every situation 
in which I go to Lyon is a situation in which I meet a woman and a child (not 
necessarily the same each time). The second sentence contains the definite description 
'the woman', which is intuitively evaluated with respect to the situations introduced into 
the discourse by the preceding universal quantifier, 'each time I go to Lyon'. (For 
qualifications, see below.) Since the description in the second sentence falls outside the 
scope of that quantifier, we must handle the dependence of the description's domain 
upon the preceding quantifier by positing an intermediate, implicit quantifier over 
situations. How can we do it? 
 The situations that are implicitly quantified over in the second sentence cannot 
be exactly the same as those that are quantified over in the first sentence, viz. the 
situations in which I go to Lyon. They must contain a unique woman (since they will 
serve for the evaluation of the definite description 'the woman'), hence they should be 
thought of as the minimal situations which satisfy the conditions set up in the previous 
sentence. By 'the conditions set up in the previous sentence' I mean the conditions 
conveyed by (i) the restriction of the explicit quantifier, and (ii) the matrix clause. If the 
first sentence says that for  situations such that p (restriction) it is the case that q 
(matrix), then an anaphoric description 'the F' in the following sentence will be 
evaluated with respect to the minimal situations in which it is the case that p and q.  
Along those lines, example (5) can be tentatively represented as follows: 
 
Each time I go to Lyon, I meet a woman and a child. 
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[Every s: in s, I go to Lyon] [an x: womans (x)] [a y: childs (y)] (I meet  x and y) 
The woman gives me her newspaper. 
<Every s': s' min{s: in s, I go to Lyon & I meet a woman and a child}>  [the z: 
womans' (z)] (z gives me her newspaper) 
 
 That is not quite satisfactory, however. Just as, in the first sentence, the clause 'I 
meet a woman and a child' is evaluated with respect to the situations introduced by the 
quantifier 'each time I go to Lyon', in the second sentence the clause 'the woman gives 
me her newspaper' is to be evaluated with respect to the situations introduced by the 
implicit quantifier. If we take those situations to be minimal situations in which I go to 
Lyon and I meet a child and a woman, as in the foregoing analysis, then we are 
prevented from accounting for simple variants of (5) like the following: 
 
(6) Each time I go to Lyon, I meet a woman and a child. The woman introduces me to 
another woman. 
 
Since the second sentence, 'the woman introduces me to another woman', is to be 
evaluated with respect to the situations introduced by the implicit quantifier, those 
situations cannot be the minimal situations mentioned above (i.e. situations in which 
there is a unique woman). They must be non-minimal extensions possibly containing 
several women — since there must be at least two women in the relevant situations for 
the second sentence of (6) to come out true.
xiv
 
 What this shows is that we need to draw a distinction between the situation(s) 
with respect to which the second sentence of either (5) or (6) is evaluated, and the 
situation(s) with respect to which the definite description in that sentence is evaluated. 
The latter situations must be minimal so as to contain a unique woman, but the former 
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must be nonminimal (extended) so as to possibly contain several women. The analysis 
of (5) must be revised accordingly. I suggest that we add another implicit quantifier, in 
the scope of the implicit universal quantifier over minimal situations, so as to introduce 
the extended situations with respect to which the second sentence of the example is to 
be evaluated. (A situation s1 extends a situation s2  just in case  s2  ≤ s1  & s1  ≠ s2.) 
The analysis we arrive at is the following: 
 
Each time I go to Lyon, I meet a woman and a child. 
[Every s: in s, I go to Lyon] ([an x: womans (x)] [a y: childs (y)] (I meet  x and y))s 
The woman gives me her newspaper. 
<Every s': s' min{s: in s, I go to Lyon & I meet a woman and a child}> < s'': Ext 
(s'', s')>  ([the z: womans' (z)] (z gives me her newspaper))s'' 
 
For the sake of perspicuousness I have marked the situations with respect to which the 
clauses 'I meet a woman and a child' and 'the woman gives me her newspaper' are 
evaluated. (The situations in question are determined by the explicit or implicit 
quantifier right above the clause.) As we can see, the clause 'the woman gives me her 
newspaper' is now evaluated with respect to a nonminimal situation s'', possibly 
containing several women, while the minimal situation s' of which it is an extension 
serves for the evaluation of the definite description 'the woman'. 
 Another class of examples which can be handled in this sort of way are the so-
called 'bound' uses of definite descriptions. George Wilson (1984: 23) gives the 
following example: 
 
(7) Every Bulgarian scientist who was fired from the observatory was consoled by 
someone who had known the Bulgarian scientist as a youth. 
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According to Wilson, 'the Bulgarian scientist' in this sentence functions like a pronoun 
bound by the quantifier 'every Bulgarian scientist'. Such a use is not amenable to 
Russellian analysis, he says; for it carries ‘no implication or presupposition that the 
descriptor is satisfied uniquely, and there is no suggestion at all that the speaker or the 
audience could supply a qualification to the descriptor in virtue of which it would 
uniquely apply’ (Wilson 1984: 23). In his contribution to this volume, however, 
Stephen Neale insists that even that type of example can be accounted for in a 
Russellian framework. He shows this by appealing to the approach in terms of semantic 
ellipsis (the 'explicit approach', as he calls it): he analyses the description as 'the y: 
Bulgarian-scientist y & y = x', where (i) 'x' is a variable bound by the higher quantifier 
'every x: Bulgarian scientist x', and (ii) the entire clause 'y = x' is unarticulated and 
results from contextually enriching the matrix of the description. Neale concludes that 
the description 'the Bulgarian scientist' ‘ is not, pace Wilson, a variable, but just another 
description that is elliptical for a fuller description that contains a variable.’xv  Now the 
same sort of solution is available if we opt for the approach in terms of situational 
completion (the 'implicit' approach, in Neale's terminology). Instead of enriching the 
matrix of the description with an unarticulated clause, as Neale does, we can appeal, 
once again, to an implicit quantifier over situations (or, rather, to a pair of quantifiers, 
as in the previous example). Wilson's example (7) can be given the following analysis: 
 
[Every x: Bulgarian-scientists (x) & fired-from-the-observatorys (x)] <Every s': s' 
min{s: in s, Bulgarian-scientist (x) & fired-from-the-observatory (x)}> < s'': Ext (s'', 
s')> ([The y: Bulgarian-scientists' (y) ] (x was consoled by someone who had known y 
as a youth))s'' 
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The description 'the Bulgarian scientist' in the second relative clause is evaluated with 
respect to a situation introduced by an implicit universal quantifier. (The relative clause 
itself is evaluated with respect to yet another situation, introduced by an implicit 
existential quantifier in the scope of the implicit universal quantifier). The dependence 
of the description upon the higher quantifier 'every Bulgarian scientist' is accounted for 
by having the matrix of the implicit universal quantifier contain variables bound by the 
higher quantifier. On this analysis (7) is very much like (4): in both cases a situational 
variable is indirectly bound by an overt quantifier, via an implicit quantifier which 
binds that variable and itself contains a variable bound by the overt quantifier. 
 
V. Conclusion 
 
In this article I have argued that neither the referential nor even the quasi-referential 
analysis solves the incompleteness problem. Instead I have put forward a theory 
according to which every nominal predicate is associated with a situation variable. (See 
Recanati 1987, 1996 for earlier versions of this view.) That variable may be 
contextually assigned a value, but it may also be bound by a higher quantifier, explicitly 
or implicitly. In this framework domain restriction proceeds through the assignment of 
values to the situational variable. The descriptive condition corresponding to the 
predicate 'F' in a definite description 'the F' becomes uniquely identifying (it is satisfied 
by a single object) when that predicate is evaluated with respect to the situation which 
is the value of the associated variable. The uniqueness constraint which the determiner 
'the' imposes on the predicate 'F' is what guides the assignment of value to the situation 
variable associated with it: 'the' in 'the F' tells us that the predicate 'F' must denote a 
singleton-set in the relevant situation, and the situation variable associated with 'F' is 
assigned a value accordingly. 
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 In this framework one can unify a number of the uses of definite descriptions. A 
definite description is analysed as a restricted quantifier 'the x: Fx'. What distinguishes 
the families of use that have been recorded in the typological litterature is the situation 
with respect to which the predicate 'F' is evaluated. Four distinctions emerge: 
 
• Complete vs. incomplete. — The difference between 'complete' and 'incomplete' 
descriptions pertains to the situation with respect to which such descriptions are meant 
to be evaluated — a partial situation for incomplete descriptions, the total world for 
complete descriptions (assuming there are any). 
• Ordinary vs. anaphoric. — What characterizes the so-called anaphoric uses of 
descriptions is the fact that the description is evaluated with respect to situations 
introduced in the discourse, instead of situations made salient in some other way. 
Anaphora may be intrasentential or intersentential, depending on where the 'antecedent' 
is found. 
• Situationally singular vs. general. — That is the distinction between cases in which 
the relevant situation is referred to and cases in which there is quantification over 
situations. Both anaphoric cases (whether intra- or intersentential) and ordinary, non-
anaphoric cases may be either situationally singular or situationally general. 
• Explicit vs. implicit. — Whether the situations of evaluation are referred to (s-singular 
uses) or quantified over (s-general uses), this can be done explicitly or implicitly. 
Several difficult cases, such as the bound uses of definite descriptions mentioned by 
George Wilson, can be handled in terms of implicit quantification over situations. 
 
Even though the four distinctions are independent, there seems to be a strong 
connection between anaphoricity and explicitness. Non-anaphoric cases are, by 
definition, cases in which the relevant situation is not given in the discourse, but in 
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some other way. It follows that the relevant situation cannot be 'explicit' (i.e. 
linguistically articulated) in such cases. But the connection between the explicit/implicit 
distinction and the anaphoric/non-anaphoric distinction is not as strong as it may seem. 
The situations with respect to which a given description is evaluated may remain 
implicit even though the description counts as 'anaphoric' in a loose sense. That is so, 
for example, whenever the relevant situations are implicitly quantified over but the 
course of values of the situational variable is parasitic upon that of an explicitly 
quantified variable found elsewhere in the discourse, as in examples (4) and (7). 
 Before closing, I would like to say something about the referential uses of 
definite descriptions with which our inquiry started. That use falls out as the special 
case in which the completing situation — the value of the situational variable — has the 
following properties: (i) it is demonstratively given, and (ii) it bears a specific relation 
to the denotatum, namely that relation which holds between a situation s and an object o 
just in case one cannot demonstrate s without demonstrating o, because o occupies a 
central position in s. (When that is so, I say that the situation s highlights the object o.) 
 To say that the completing situation is 'demonstratively given' is to say that it is 
is an aspect of c, the situation of utterance. By focussing exclusively on that feature of 
referential descriptions, one may be tempted to oversimplify and to treat referential 
descriptions as nothing but descriptions evaluated with respect to c. That, I think, is a 
mistake: the second feature of referential descriptions is no less important than the first 
one. To see that, let us consider an example discussed by Heim in her paper  'Articles 
and Definiteness' (1991). 
 Heim considers a view very similar to that which I put forward regarding the 
completion of nominal predicates. On the view she considers, nouns and verbs possess 
extra argument positions for worlds and times, but nouns are special in that their world 
and time arguments can be chosen freely. (In contrast, the world and time arguments of 
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a verb are always locally bound, i.e. bound by the proposition abstractor or tense or 
modal operator at the clause boundary right above it.) Heim argues that the extra 
argument positions enable us to obtain something very much like a referential reading 
for definite descriptions even in contexts where the description takes narrow scope. She 
gives the following example: 
 
(8) It is always the case that the player on the left wins 
 
Because of syntactic scope barriers, the description cannot take wide scope over the 
temporal operator 'it is always the case that'. Still, we find that (8) has a reading in 
which the actual player-on-the-left is said to win in all situations (whether or not he 
plays on the left in those situations). The existence of such a reading seems to support 
the view that descriptions have a genuine referential use which is irreducible to a matter 
of scope. As Heim points out, we can account for that reading in terms of the extra 
argument positions associated with nouns: we can consider that the situation (world-
time pair) with respect to which the nominal predicate 'player on the left' is evaluated is 
not the circumstance of evaluation for the sentence (i.e. the class of situations 
introduced by the operator 'it is always the case that') but the situation of utterance c: a 
situation in which a certain man happens to be playing on the left. Using situation 
variables, (8) can be represented as 
 
[Every s: s is a game of the relevant sort] ([the x: player-on-the-leftc (x)] (x wins))s 
 
This suggests that the so-called referential reading much emphasized by Strawson, 
Donnellan and others can be accounted for within the classical approach — say, in the 
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Russellian framework — even though, as (8) shows, it cannot be reduced to a matter of 
scope. 
 I agree with Heim that the relevant reading can be accounted for in this way. But 
I want to emphasize that this is definitely not the 'referential' reading — the reading 
talked about by Strawson, Donnellan and others. Even if we assume that the completing 
situation invoked by the speaker is demonstratively given in the context of utterance, 
still this does not, by itself, guarantee that the denotatum also is demonstratively given. 
That will be guaranteed only if the situation highlights the denotatum. But there are 
many situations which involve an object without highlighting it. Thus we can construct 
the following variant of Heim's example:  
 
(9) It is always the case that the player on the left, whoever he is, wins at the last minute 
 
(I have added 'at the last minute' for purely stylistic reasons.) This has a natural 
interpretation on which 'player on the left' is evaluated with respect to the situations s 
introduced by the operator 'it will always be the case that' — situations across which the 
identity of the player-on-the-left may vary. As Heim pointed out in connection with (8), 
another, 'rigid' reading is available, where only the actual 'player on the left' is at issue. 
In this case the speaker says of the man who happens to be the player on the left in the 
current situation that he always wins. Still, as the qualification 'whoever he is' in (9) 
makes clear, the speaker is not in a position to refer to or identify the person in 
question; she can only describe him as 'the player on the left'. For example, we may 
imagine that the player in question is hidden from view, so that the speaker can 
demonstrate the global situation, but not the player on the left who is a (hidden) 
constituent of that situation. Thus construed, the situation in question does not highlight 
the player on the left. The description is not used referentially, even though the 
  
41 
41 
completing situation is demonstrated. So we need two further distinctions within the 
category of 'singular uses': 
 
• Deictic vs. nondeictic. — A situationally singular use of a description (i.e. a use in 
which the situation of evaluation is tacitly or explicitly referred to) counts as deictic 
whenever the focus situation is (an aspect of) the situation of utterance. That is the case 
in the relevant readings of (8) and (9). 
• Referential vs. nonreferential. — A deictic use of a description counts as referential 
(in the sense of Strawson-Donnellan) iff the focus situation highlights the denotatum. 
That is definitely not the case in (9). 
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i
 See Recanati 1993: 135-167. 
ii
 Many theorists hold that the condition associated with demonstrative pronouns is 
token-reflexive: thus a token of  'she' is said to denote the female the speaker is 
pointing at while uttering that token, or the most relevant female in the context of 
utterance of the token. As far as I am concerned, I admit that the complex pragmatic-
cum-descriptive condition associated with demonstrative pronouns is both uniquely-
identifying and token-reflexive (see below), but I deny that the descriptive condition 
per se has either of these properties. 
iii
 This applies to the bound uses of descriptions, as much as to their referential uses. 
Just as the referential use of a description resembles the deictic use of a pronoun, the 
'bound' uses of descriptions resemble the bound uses of pronouns. A theory which takes 
these similarities at face value is preferable, ceteris paribus, to a theory which does not. 
As George Wilson says (1984: 11), ‘the uses of pronouns and descriptions need to be 
understood together’. 
iv
 ‘The syntactic ellipsis approach... strikes me as a nonstarter’ (Bach 2000: 267n); ‘I 
find it hard to believe anyone has ever proposed such a clumsy and bizarre view’ 
(Neale 2000: 292). 
v
 There are two versions of the theory, depending on the exact status of the contextually 
provided property H. According to one account the contextually provided property is an 
unarticulated constituent of the statement made by uttering the sentence, just as the 
location of rain is an unarticulated constituent of the statement made by saying ‘It's 
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raining’ (Perry 1986). Thus Schiffer says that a possible meaning rule for 'The F is G' 
is: 
 
Utter 'the F is G' only if there is a property H such that you mean that the F and H is G. 
(Schiffer 1997: 256) 
 
Other theorists deny that there are unarticulated constituents and think such constituents 
are always the value contextually assigned to a free variable in logical form (Stanley 
2000). If one takes this line, one will say that every description 'the F' comes with a free 
variable for the extra property H, which variable is assigned a definite value in context. 
vi
  Soames 1986: 352; Neale 1990: 101. 
vii
 As Wiggins puts it (in a different context), to know which entity a given expression 
refers to is ‘a single piece of knowledge which can be given in countless different ways 
by countless different descriptions’ (Wiggins 1975: 11). 
viii
  As Herman Cappelen pointed out to me, giving up the ellipsis theory may not be 
sufficient to get rid of indeterminacy. There is no reason why there shouldn't be 
indeterminacy also with respect to the focus situation: for a given utterance involving a 
definite description, several distinct completing situations may turn out to be 
compatible with all relevant aspects of the context. Indeed, according to Stephen Neale, 
indeterminacy cannot be eliminated, whichever framework one opts for. ‘To the extent 
that there are aspects of what is said that are not directly traceable to particular semantic 
features of [the uttered sentence], indeterminacy is going be inevitable — at least if 
what is meant by «indeterminacy» is that there are competing characterizations of what 
U said among which no principled choice can be made’(Neale 2002). 
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If Cappelen and Neale are right, the case against the ellipsis theory is admittedly 
weakened. But how much ? ‘One consequence of the ubiquity of indeterminacy’, Neale 
says, ‘is that all versions of a type of argument used by Wettstein, Récanati, Reimer, 
Schiffer and others against traditional explicit (or ellipsis-based) accounts of what U 
said by uttering X, where X contains a so-called incomplete description, such as «the 
book», are discredited’ (id.). This goes a bit too far, I think. Even if it is ultimately 
ineliminable, indeterminacy should not be multiplied without necessity. For that reason 
the ‘semantic’ version of the  ellipsis theory is preferable to the syntactic version, and 
the semantic version in terms of ‘referential completers’ is preferable to the semantic 
version in terms of ‘descriptive completers’. For the very same reason, the approach in 
terms of situations seems to me preferable to the ellipsis theory. Still, I agree with 
Cappelen and Neale that considerations of indeterminacy cannot be decisive, given the 
pervasiveness of the phenomenon. Hence I do not take myself to have refuted the 
ellipsis theory. Rather, I have tried to provide reasons for exploring the alternative 
approach in terms of situations. A systematic comparison of the two approaches will be 
possible only after each one has been sufficiently elaborated. 
ix
 According to a Davidsonian, event-based analysis, the first sentence of (1) should be 
understood as saying that there is a situation of a certain type, namely a past event 
consisting of my meeting a child and a woman in Lyon the other day. The situation is 
no more referred to than the child and the woman are. 
x
  ≤ is the part-of relation between situations. A minimal situation such that p is a 
situation s such that (i) in s, p, and (ii) there is no s' such that (a) in s', p and (b) s' is a 
proper part of s. (See Heim 1990: 146. Borrowing ideas from S. Berman, Heim defines 
'minimal' as follows: min S = {s S:  ¬  s' S [ s' ≤ s & s' ≠ s]}, where S is a set of 
situations.) 
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xi
 As this brief discussion shows, a simple sentence such as (3)  has a number of 
possible interpretations. One may or may not refer to the denotatum; and one may or 
may not refer to the situation with respect to which the description is to be evaluated. In 
the generic reading of the description in (3) we don't refer but quantify over situations; 
in the referential reading we refer to both the situation and the denotatum which 
features in it; in the attributive reading, we don't refer to the denotatum, but we may or 
may not refer to the situation with respect to which the description is to be evaluated. 
(Sentence (3) can be interpreted as saying that in all US situations s, the President in s, 
whoever he is, lives in the White House; or as saying that in this particular situation, s1, 
the President in s1, whoever he is, lives in the White House.) Moreover, when there is 
implicit quantification over situations, the implicit universal quantifier can be variously 
restricted.  
xii
 See Recanati 1996: 454-457, where I discuss, inter alia, Kempson's example: 'The 
hostages were welcomed home by the President'. As Kempson points out, ‘at the point 
in time in the past at which a set of people is welcomed home by their president, they 
are transparently no longer hostages’, hence we need to evaluate the noun-phrase with 
respect to a situation distinct from that with respect to which the sentence is evaluated. 
xiii
 It is possible to explicitly represent the situation with respect to which the main 
clause ‘the controller is a woman’ is evaluated, by introducing another situational 
variable bound by the situation-indicator: 
[Every s: in s, I go to Lyon by train] [the x: controllers (x)] (woman (x))s 
Such a variable is redundant, however, since the situation of evaluation can only be 
determined by the situation-indicator right above the sentence. This feature makes the 
situation-indicator similar to a modal operator, and I emphasize that similarity by 
omitting the redundant situational variable in the nuclear scope. 
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xiv
 Here again, I am indebted to Heim's discussion of related issues in Heim 1990. 
xv
 This volume, p. 00. Note that this provides us with the means for reducing pronouns 
to descriptions if we want to. E-type pronouns are classically treated as descriptions; 
deictic pronouns can be treated as incomplete descriptions ('he' = the male, etc.). The 
main difficulty raised for descriptive theories of pronouns comes from bound pronouns. 
Now, following Neale's suggestion, we can treat bound pronouns as not themselves 
variables, but rather as descriptions containing (bound) variables. 
